Maurer School of Law: Indiana University

Digital Repository @ Maurer Law
Articles by Maurer Faculty

Faculty Scholarship

1932

The Duty of the Husband to Support the Wife
Robert C. Brown
Indiana University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Brown, Robert C., "The Duty of the Husband to Support the Wife" (1932). Articles by Maurer Faculty. 1741.
https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1741

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by
Maurer Faculty by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

VIRGINIA

LAW REVIEW
Vol. XVIII

JUNE, 1932

No. 8

THE DUTY OF THE HUSBAND TO SUPPORT
THE WIFE

N

O PART of the law bas. been more completely transformed
in the past century than that relating to husband and wife.
The wife has been advanced from her common law position of
practically a chattel to one of equality with, if not superior to,
that of her spouse. But certain phases of even this branch of
law remain substantially unchanged, and of these one of the most
conspicuous examples is that relating to the duty of the husband
to support the wife. It is entirely clear that the married women's
acts in the various states have not stbstantially affected the binding force of this obligation.'
It is -believed that the general attitude of the courts, which has
just been stated, is justified. True it is that married women are
now perfectly free to become self-supporting, and the number
who have in' fact become wage-earners is so large as to be perhaps somewhat embarrassing in times of financial depression.
Nevertheless, the typical wife is still primarily a home-maker,
whose function is not to earn but rather to perform the more important work of attending to the physical, mental, and moral welfare of her husband and children. So long as this remains, as
it does, the normal situation (even though it may be departed
from in very numerous cases) the duty of support which the
courts have cast upon the husband is unlikely to be appreciably
lightened.
Indeed there is a considerable tendency to extend this duty, or
at least to buttress it by creating more effective methods of enforcement. Thus most states have statutes making it a criminal
Grandy v. Hadcock, 85 App. Div. 173, 83 N. Y. S. 90 (1903) ; Flynn
v. Messenger, 28 Minn. 208, 9 N. W. 759 (1881).
1
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offense for a husband to fail without proper excuse to support
the wife." Such statutes are generally drawn so as to permit the
erring husband to go free provided that he will support the wife
in the future, and so are rather coercive than punitive.3 But
proceedings brought under such statutes are criminal in nature
and the husband is entitled to the rights of any person accused
4
of a crime.
In addition, several states have made the failure of the husband to support the wife a ground for divorce. 5 This ground is,
of course, available only to the wife, and the primary purpose of
such statutes is obviously to furnish additional coercion on the
husband to do his duty in this respect.
THE NATURE OF THE DUTY

When the courts were confronted with the problem of enforcing this duty they were obliged to decide as to its nature-or
perhaps more accurately they had to decide into which of the
categories among which they had attempted to apportion all legal
questions, this particular class of cases should be put.
Until comparatively recently the courts seem to have been
unanimous in their answer to this problem. This answer was
that it falls within the principles of the law of agency-that is,
that the wife acts as the agent of the husband when she buys
those things which she requires, and she can therefore make him
liable for the purchase price.( There is no question that the wife
may be and frequently is the agent of the husband, and even yet
many courts see no difference between cases -where the wife acts
For typical cases dealing with the construction of these statutes, see
State v. Lancaster, 135 S. C. 412, 133 S. E. 824 (1926) ; State v. Kelly, 100
'

Conn. 727, 125 Atl. 95 (1924) ; State v. McPherson, 72 Wash. 371, 130 Pac.
481 (1913); State v. Hill, 161 Iowa 279, 142 N. W. 231 (1913).
Provision, is usually made for a suspended sentence during such time as
the husband shall actually support the wife, the court in the meantime keeping a strict supervision on his activities and having the power to imprison
him for any delinquency. It is often provided, also, that the earnings of a
husband in prison for violation of this statute shall be transmitted to the wife.
State v. Lancaster, supra note 2.
See MADDEN, DoimsTic RnLArxoNs (1931) 291.
'Jones v. Gutman, 88 Md. 355, 41 AtL. 792 (1898) ; Jolly v. Rees, 15 C. B.
N. S. 628.(1864); Reid v. Teakle, 13 C. B. 628 (1853); Houliston v. Smyth,
2 Car. & P. 11 (1825).
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with the actual or apparent consent of the husband and those
where he is bound even against his protest made known not only
7
to the wife but to those with whom she deals.

As already said, the wife frequently acts as agent for the husband, indeed this is probably one of the most usual agency situations. It seems that mere cohabitation of the spouses is not sufficient to constitute "holding out" of the wife by the husband so
as to'make him liable for her purchases.-' But very little more
added to cohabitation, such as paying bills incurred by the wife,
will subject the husband to liability for subsequent bills.9 It
should be noted that the husband's liability is not limited to purchases of necessities of the wife and family; he is liable for ordinary and reasonable family expenses even though these extend
beyond what can be considered as strictly necessary. 10 The wife
may even be held out by her spouse as having wider authority, so
that she may bind him for expenses wholly outside the household; "1but here the fact that the alleged agent is his wife will
not generally subject the principal to any other or greater liability
than if this were not the case.' 2
The wife herself when she acts as agent for her husband has
substantially the same rights and liabilities as any other agent.
At common law, she cannot of course be liable on any warranty
of authority;
but it would seem that modem statites, which
subject married women to full contract liability, at least as respects others than their husbands, have changed this rule.
The scope of the wife's agency is likewise governed by ordiBroun v. Durepo, 121 Me. 226, 116 Atl. 451 (1922).
MARRaRIA,
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See 1 ScHouIE,

DomSsTic RELATIONS (6th ed., 1921)

124.
* Debenham v. Mellon, L R. 6 A. C. 24 (1880).

* Gilman v. Andrus, 28 Vt. 241 (1856).
'Flynn

v. Messenger, supra note 1.

Gates v. Bower, 9 N. Y. 205 (1853) where the husband was held liable
to pay for horses purchased by the wife for work on the farm which the
husband was permitting the wife to manage.
"Benjamin v. Benjamin, 15 Conn. 347 (1843). Here the husband was
held not bound by the action of his wife in selling farm produce in payment
of the debt of the husband, although the wife was in full charge of the farm
operations and could clearly have made a sale of the produce in the ordinary
course.
' Smout v. Ibery, 10 M. & W. 1 (1842). See 1 WnTissoN, SAT.Vs (2nd
ed., 1924) 78.
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nary principles. While, as already pointed out, the husband is
liable for more than mere necessities, yet, unless through actual
authorizatioij he is not liable for purchases so extravagant in
accordance with the circumstances of the family as to throw an
obvious doubt on her authority to make them. 14 Yet the fact of
previous acquiescence in previous similar purchases may subject
the husband to liability for the wife's extravagances even though
they have no relation to family matters.1 5 It has been held in
England that a husband cannot enjoin the wife from buying even
extravagantly on his credit; 16 but this very unfortunate result
is derived from the assumption that the acts of a wife are purely
tortious. Even admitting this rather dubious point, the tort
seems to relate to property rights (the husband's credit) as to
which each spouse is entitled to protection from the other; and
the fact (if it is a fact) that the husband cannot get damages
for this wrong to him seems no reason why he should not be able
to enjoin it. The decision, therefore, seems unsound.
A true agency of the wife for the husband can obviously be
revoked like any other agency. 17 And when the wife assumes to
bind her husband, but without actual or apparent authority to do
so, he may nevertheless be bound by ratification, and this is so
even though it is authoritatively determined that the purchases
were not necessary or even proper."'
The scope of the agency of the wife for the husband is thus
very wide, but it is not wide enough to include support in its
real sense. It is true that there is judicial recognition in other
connections of the power of the law to appoint a compulsory
1

Lane v. Ironmonger, 13 M. & W. 368 (1844) ; Freestone v. Butcher, 9

Carr. & P. 992 (1840); Seaton v. Benedict, 5 Bing. 28 (1828).
M'George v. Egan, 5 Bing. N. C. 197 (1839) where the husband was
compelled to pay school expenses of his wife's niece, because he had previously 'paid similar charges without protest.
16 Webster v. Webster, (1916)
1 K. B. 714.
Etherington v. Parrot, 2 Ld. Raym. 1006 (1703).
See Cowell v. Phillips, 17 R. I. 188, 20 Atl. 933 (1890).
' Conrad v. Abbott, 132 Mass. 330 (1882); Day v. Burnham, 36 Vt. 37
(1863); Ogden v. Prentice, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 160 (1860).
In Mickelberry
v. Harvey, 58 Ind. 523 (1877) the wife purchased certain furniture which
was not necessary, because the family was already sufficiently supplied. It
was held that the husband could nevertheless be held for it because of his
ratification of the wife's purchase.
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agent for one whom it is desired to hold to a certain liability; 19
but this is clearly a most awkward and unrealistic way to handle
the matter. Agency is primarily consensual, and the husband
who is compelled to pay for necessaries purchased by his wife
against. his own protest made known to the merchant, is held not
because his wife acted as his agent, but because the law imposes
upon him the duty to support her. There is an increasing recognition by the courts of this sharp distinctionbetween the frequent
and genuine agency of the wife for the husband and the limited
but important power which she has to bind him to pay for her
support, even against his actual or even apparent dissent. 20 Sometimes it is insisted that it is all agency, but that the liability for
support is an agency by necessity, a compulsory agency, or something else of that description; 21 but this is an obvious recognition,
though clumsily expressed, of this same distinction. The truth is
that this obligation of the husband is quasi-contractual in nature;
in other words, it is an obligation imposed by law without, and
usually against, the husband's consent.2 2 It would seem to follow that the husband is liable for only the fair value rather than
the actual sale price of necessaries furnished to the wife; but
there do not seem to be any authorities which apply this proposi-

tion.
The chief practical difference between obligations arising out
of this obligation to support and fhose coming from a genuine
agency of the wife is that the husband has no power to relieve
himself of the former by the obvious means, such as notice, by
which an agent can be deprived of his power to bind the principal. No notice to merchants or others who are supplying the
wife with necessities will absolve the husband from the liability
" As, for example, when a foreign corporation is required as a condition
to doing business in the state, to appoint some state officer as its "agent" for
service of process. See Tucker v. Columbia Ins. Co., 232 Mass. 224, 122
N. E. 285 (1919).
See I WILLISTON, SAavs, 79, and Schouler, supra note 7. See also McFerren v. Goldsmith, 137 Md. 573, 113 AtI. 107 (1921); Johnson v. Briscoe,
104 Mo. App. 493, 79 S. W. 498 (1904).
' Fisher v. Drew, 247 Mass. 178, 141 N. E. 875 (1924).; Woodward v.
Barnes, 43 Vt. 330 (1871).
SKJNSR, QUASI CONTRACTS .(1893) 22; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS
(1913) § 203.
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to pay for such articles, unless indeed the circumstances are such
that the wife is no longer entitled to support.2 3 A fortiori, notice to the wife, alone, will not absolve the husband 2 4 though of
course this same rule would often apply in cases of genuine
agency. A public notice will therefore relieve the husband for
liability on non-necessary purchases by the wife 2 5 -but, because
of his duty to support her, not for her purchases of necessaries.2 6
So long as the husband performs his duty of support, or endeavors in good faith to do so, the method and effect of his performance are very largely in his own discretion. Thus, while
necessaries furnished to the wife become presumptively her own
property,2 7 yet they may be merely lent to her, and the husband's
property claim is binding as against the creditors of the wife.28
But where the husband makes it impossible for the wife to live
with him, he can probably not determine her place of residence 29
nor the merchants from whom she shall purchase necessaries.30
These apparently inconsistent principles can be reconciled by the
theory that the husband is to have the general direction of the
wife's expenditures which -bind him, but not to such an extent
as to unduly burden the wife and thus make her right to support
ineffective.
The distinction which has been insisted on between true agency
and support must be conceded to have less practical effect when
the spouses are cohabiting. The husband has, of course, at least
' Pierpont v, Wilson, 49 Conn. 450 (1881); Rea v. Durkee, 25 Ill. 414
(1861); Bolton v. Prentice, 2 Str. 1214 (1745).
" Vaughan v. Mansfield, 229 Mass. 352, 118 N. E. 652 (1918). The same
applies to private communications to any other member of the family. Cothran v. Lee, 24 Ala. 380 (1854).
s Woodward v. Barnes, supra note 21.
See Walker v. Leighton, 31 N. H. 111 (1855), where the court apparently ov erlooked this principle by deciding that a merchant could sue a husband who was failing to support his family although the husband had giveft
public notice that he would not be responsible for his wife's purchases, "since
there is no proof tending to show that it ever came to his (the merchant's) notice." Under such circumstances, the notice given by the husband
is properly to be considered as of no effect whatever.
M
Masson v. De Fries, (1909) 2 K. B. 831.
' Rondeau v. Marks, (1918) 1 K. B. 75.
' Kirk v. Chinstrand, 85 Minn. 108, 88 N. W. 422 (1901).
' Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 N. J. Eq. 715, 120 AtI. 790 (1923).
But see
Kimball v. Keyes. 11 Wend. (N. Y.) 33 (1833).
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as great a duty to support a wife who cohabits with him as one
who does not; but in case of cohabitation the husband is ordinarily
liable, on principles of agency, for the wife's purchases, even
though they are not necessaries. No nice distinction between
agency and support is therefore generally required. 31 The presumption is that the wife can -bind the husband for all her ordinary purchases.3 2 .But, as already seen, the husband has much
greater power to control the wife in the details of such matters
when they are cohabiting than when she is justifiably living apart
from him; 33 and the mere fact of cohabitation is not conclusive
that she has apparent authority to bind him as his agent. 34 More
important than all this, the husband may by notice to the tradesmen effectively revoke all actual or apparent authority of the wife
to act as his agent without putting an end to their cohabitation.
While this does not often happen, yet when it does, the distinction
between agency and support is vital though the spouses are still
cohabiting; for the husband has, of course, still the duty to support the wife.
WHO

Is ENTrLZED To Bn

SUPPORTED?

This question seems to admit of a very simple answer. Any
wife is entitled to support. Thus, the fact that the spouses were
under the legal age of consent will not deprive the wife of the
right to support, such a marriage being only voidable and not
void. 35 So a common law wife is entitled to support in jurisdictions which recognize such marriages. 36
- More troublesome is the situation where there is cohabitation
but no marriage. The problem has arisen in two recent American cases,37 in both of which the putative wife had been married and that marriage had not been dissolved; but in neither case
'1 Leuppie v. Osborn, 52 N. J. Eq. 637, 29 AtI. 433 (1894); Trotter v.
Trotter, 77 Ill. 510 (1875) ; Johnson v. Briscoe, supra note 20.
' Adkins v. Hastings, 138 Md. 454, 114 Atl. 288 (1921).
But cf. Jones
v. Gutnan, supra note 6.
" Pattberg v. Pattberg, stfpra note 30.
" Debenham v. Mellon, supra note 8.
"State v. McPherson, supra n~ote 2.
Poole v. People, 24 Colo. 510, 52 Pac. 1025 (1898).
Jordan Marsh v. Hedtler, 238 Mass. 43, 130 N. E. 78 (1921); Frankr.
Carter, 219 N. Y. 35, 113 N. E. 549 (1916).
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was the supposed husband aware of this when the purchases were
made. The courts in both instances held the supposed husbands
liable. The opinions contain much agency language, but the
courts also took comfort from demonstrating to their own satisfaction that the purchases were necessaries. It is submitted that
the latter problem was improperly considered, since a man has
no duty to support a woman who is not (or at least who never
was 38) his wife, whether or not he thinks she is. But in both
cases the supposed husband was correctly held liable to the merchant because from cohabitation and other circumstances there
was apparent authority of the woman to bind him as his agent.
It has even been held in an early English case 39 that a man who
voluntarily cohabits with a woman not his wife is liable for her
purchases of necessaries from a merchant who knew that she was
not his wife; but the soundness of this decision is very doubtful.
If the defendant is to be held at all, it must be on principles of
agency, and in that case, the question whether or not the purchases were necessaries, is wholly immaterial.
WHAT CONSTITUTz NEC SSAM S?

Assuming that the liability of the husband to support has become fixed and that he cannot be held under any agency theory,
the problem of the definition of necessaries becomes important,
for the obligation of support is merely to furnish necessaries to
the wife. More than that she cannot demand.
The term obviously includes food, clothing, and shelter required by the wife; but it is much broader thdn this. It also includes medical and dental services, 40 and it has been held to include furniture under certain circumstances. 41 On the other
hand, a set of "Stoddard's Lectures" has been held not to be a
necessary,4 21 though it would hardly follow from this that all books
are luxuries in this sense.
'

It is, of course, common to award alimony to a divorced wife and thus

really compel her former husband to support her.
" Watson v. Threlkeld, 2 Esp. 637 (1798).
' Simpson v. Drake, 150 Tenn. 84, 262 S. W. 41 (1924); Clark v. Tenneson, 146 Wis. 65, 130 N. W. 895 (1911).
See
" Jordan Marsh v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 245, 136 N. E. 350 (1922).
MickelberrY v. Harvey, supra note 18.
" Shuman v. Steinel, 129 Wis. 422, 109 N. W. 74 (1906).
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The tendency seems to be to widen the scope of this classification of necessaries. Many articles which are commonly regarded
as luxuries, and are certainly more ornamental than useful, are
coming to be regarded as things for which the husband must pay,
even against his own wishes. Thus it has been held improper to
rule that a locket and chain and a watch, all of gold, were not
necessaries; 43 though this has been disputed. 44 It has even been
held in Massachusetts that a fur coat is a necessary.4 5 Despite
the rigorous climate of the Bay State one is tempted to feel that
this case goes a trifle too far; but the actual decision is correct,
since the parties, though not validly married, were cohabiting
under such circumstances as gave the putative wife apparent authority to bind the man as his agent; and the purchase was not
extravagant in view of the circumstances of the supposed husband. 4"
The truth seems to be that the financial cir6umstances of the
family if the spouses are living together, and to a lesser extent
ot the husband if they are separated, are given a certain weight
in this matter. This tendency does not go so far as to destroy
any distinction between necessaries and family expenses under
the statutes imposing a liability on both spouses for such expenses.4 7 A necessary is something needed rather than merely
desired by the wife; but what she needs is dependent to some
extent upon what she has become accustomed to, and what her
husband may reasonably be expected to supply. 4" In close cases
49
the problem is really one of fact and is to be left to the jury.
Apart from these general considerations there are two specific
problems with regard to the definition of necessaries which deserve notice. One of these is as to whether expenses of the wife
in connection with litigation are necessaries. If the litigation
Rayrnes v. Bennett, 114 Mass. 424 (1874).
"Johnson v. Briscoe, supra note 20.
Jordan Marsh v. Hedtler, supra note 37.
See discussion of this case, supra pp. 829, 830.
See MADDW, DoltisIc RZjLATIOs (1931) 200, for a discussion of these
statutes.
, Simpson Garment Co. v. Schultz, 182 Wis. 506, 194 N. W. 783 (1924)
where it was held error to charge that necessaries must be "suitable to the
manner of life which the husband authorizes or permits."
13 R. C. L. 1208.
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is not with the husband-for example, if they are incurred to defend the wife from a criminal prosecution-there would seem
to be no doubt that such expenses are for necessaries. 50 The
same would seem to apply where the wife is making a criminal
charge against the husband, though it has been held that where
the wife could make the charge personally, she cannot compel the
husband to pay a lawyer employed by her to do so.5 1
The principal dispute is as to attorney's fees and similar expenses incurred in divorce and separation proceedings brought by
the wife against the husband. It seems clear that the husband
should never be charged unless the action was brought in good
faith and with at least reasonable grounds. 5 2 But even with this
limitation, the prevailing view in this country is that such expenses are not necessaries with which the husband can be
charged. 53 The rule is different in England,5 4 and there is some
American authority following the English view.5 5 Where the
husband is held liable for the legal services furnished to the wife
in such a suit, he should also be obliged to pay her other needful
expenses as for detectives, etc. 56 There is some dispute as to
whether a husband must pay for legal advice which the wife considered necessary for her own protection against him; 57 but it is
submitted that he should be held liable for this, since whatever
her legal rights, she cannot reasonably 'be expected to act on them
without legal advice. But where the wife is entitled to counsel
fees in a divorce suit, there is certainly less necessity that the husEder v. Rosenwasser, 238 N. Y. 427, 144 N. E. 669 (1924).
Conant v. Burnham, 133 Mass. 503 (1882).
82 13 R. C. L. 1211 ff.
Meaher v. Mitchell, 112 Me. 416, 92 At]. 492 (1914); Shelton v. Pendletonq, 18 Conn. 423- (1847).

See Wilson v. Ford, 3 Exch. 63 (1868).
t 13 R. C. L. 1211 ff. See Mayper v. Harlan, 125 Misc. 123, 210 N. Y..
S.257 "(1923).
"

Lanyon's Detective Agency v. Cochrane, 240 N. Y. 274, 148 N. E. 520
(1925) holds that detectives employed by the wife canpot recover from the
husband for their services; but only because the court found such services
unnecessary in the particular case.
That the attorney cannot collect from the husband on the grour~d that
his services are not really necessary, see Conant v. Burnham, supra note 51,
and Meaher v. Mitchell, supra note 53. That such fees can be collected from
the husband, see Wilson v. Ford, supra note 54. The English view seems
preferable.
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band should be liable to suit by the attorneys under this prin58
ciple.
The other specific problem is whether funeral expenses of the
wife are chargeable to the husband as necessaries. Normally,
the duty of support exists only during the lives of both spouses.
But funeral expenses are so closely connected with the welfare of
the decedent and his family that they may reasonably be regarded
as a necessity. The weight of authority, therefore, requires the
husband to pay for the funeral expenses of the wife.59 Where an
opposite result is reached, or where the liability of the husband
is regarded as secondary to that of the wife's estate, -the decision
is usually dependent on some statute of the jurisdiction. 60
So far we have considered only what articles may be considered as necessaries. We must still inquire whether such an article is necessary to this particular wife at this particular time.
And here we are met with the rule that nothing can be a necessary
if the wife is adequately supplied with that article.61 If she has
enough, more is not necessary, and this no matter how elementary
and important is the need supplied by the particular article.
'If, then, the husband supplies the wife with what she needs or
with sufficient money to buy it, he is not liable for further purchases which she makes. 62 In England it has even been held that
if the husband furnishes the wife with any money at all, he is not
liable for her purchases of necessary articles, although the amount
furnished her was clearly insufficient for her support; 63 but this
case is clearly wrorig. It is proper to absolve the husband from
the duty of supporting his wife more than once; but he should
not be excused when he only half does it.
"Meaher v. Mitchell, supra note 53.
' Simpsori v. Drake, supra note 40; Barnes v. Starr, 144 Md. 218, 124

At. 922 (1923).
S1ff re Skillman's Estate, 146 Ia. 601, 125 N. W. 34"3 (1910).

The very

cryptic opinion to the same effect in Constantinides v.Walsh, 146 Mass. 281,
15 N. E. 631 (1888) is not easily understandable, but apparently depends, at
least in part, upon a state statute.
' This principle seems to have been disregarded in Mizen v. Pick, 3 M. &

W. 481 (1838).

But it is supported by overwhelming authority. Debenham

v. Mellon, supra note 8; Mickelberry v. Harvey, supra note 18; Dolan v.
Brooks, 168 Mass. 350, 47 N. E. 408 (1897).
Wanamaker v. Weaver, 176 N. Y. 75, 68 N. E. 135 (1903).
a Jolly v. Rees, supra note 6.
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A few authorities seem to make the opposite mistake; they hold
the husband for necessaries furnished to the wife although he has
given her sufficient money to pay for these things-which money
she has spent for other things.6 4 It is believed that this anomalous result is due to the failure of the courts to make the distinction so much insisted on here-that between support and true
agency. If it is the latter, the merchant or other person furnishing the articles in question to the wife is entitled to rely upon her
apparent authority to bind the husband as his agent and is not
bound to take notice of any dealings between the spouses; -but if
the obligation can arise only under the narrower category of the
duty of support, the outsider must decide at his peril not only
whether the article furnished is capable of being considered a
necessary under any circumstances, but also whether it is a necessary to this particular woman; and it is not, if her husband has
supplied her with it or with the means of getting it. It is obvious,
however, that the .fact that he has furnished a sufficient supply
of some other necessary does not affect his liability on the purchase in question if that was also of a necessary.6 5
An allied 'but quite separate question is whether a wife who
has sufficient resources to support herself is nevertheless entitled
to support from her husband. It is obvious that she does not
need to be supported, but the question still remains whether the
husband should be absolved from his duty by the purely fortuitous circumstance that his wife has independent resources.
Nevertheless, on the same theory that nothing can be a necessary to a person who has the ability to obtain such articles as
are needed, some courts hold that such a wife is not entitled to
support.6 6 But the -better view seems to be to the contrary; the
husband should not be freed from his obligation to support his
wife merely because she can, with more or less trouble, support
herself. 7 'This is especially true because the primary purpose
of the former equitable doctrines and the modem statutes for
"Hall v. Fletcher, 99 Vt. 199, 130 Atl. 685 (1925); Ruddock v. Marsh,
1 H. & N. 601 (1857).; Vaughan v. Mansfield, supra note 24.
Simpson Garment Co. v. Schultz, supra note 48.
Hunt v. Hayes, 64 Vt. 89, 23 Ati. 920 (1891) ; Litson v. Brown, 26 Ind.
489 (1866). See Dolan v. Brooks, supra note 61.
1

WILLISTON,

SALES,

80-81.
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insuring the right of separate property to married women was
to free them from the control of their husbands and not to free
the latter from their own obligations. 68 There is good authority
for the view here advocated.6 9
ExcusEs OR JUSTIVICATION VOR FAIIXURI TO SUPPORT

We must now consider the defenses which the husband may
make to a claim that he is not properly supporting his wife. Of
these one of the most frequent and certainly the most obvious is
that he is paying to her the amount prescribed by a court as alimony or the amount agreed upon between them when they
separated.
If the husband is paying alimony, it would seem clear that he
is not bound to do anything further toward the support. of his
spouse or former spouse. A detailed consideration of alimony
is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is elementary that it is
awarded for the support of the wife.70 In fact, it goes much
beyond this, not only because the amount awarded is often far
beyond the most princely ideas of what can constitute support,
but also because it is commonly awarded in divorce proceedings,
where the one-time wife becomes a wife no longer, but still gets
her alimony. But all this makes it the more evident that any
man who pays alimony is certainly doing his full duty with respect to the support of his wife or former wife, and is liable for
no more.71 But the mere fact that no alimony has been awarded
against him, even though his wife has attempted to obtain it,
does not prove that he is not liable to support her.7 2 And it has
sometimes been held that the payment of alimony pendente lite
does not bar a claim for support, as such alimony is considered
as merely paying the expenses of the litigation."8
- Methodist Episcopal Church v. Jaques, 1 Johns. Ch. 449 (N. Y. 1815).
But see the same case ir% 17 Johns. Ch. 548 (N. Y. 1820).
S American Mill Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill.
560, 117 N. E. 147 (1917);
Ott v. Hentall, 70 N. H. 231, 47 Atl. 80 (1900) ; Poole v. People, supra
note 36.
, Audubon v. Shufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 21 Sup. Ct. 735 (1901).
McFerren v. Goldsmith, supra note 20.
' Elder v. Rosenwasser, supra note 50. The decision of the lower court
(121 Misc. 181, 200 N. Y. Supp. 620) was reversed on this very ground.
" Barnes v. Starr, supra note 59; Wolf & Co. v. Mapson, 146 Minn. 174,
178 N. W. 318 (1920).
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As for payments to the wife in accordance with separation
agreements, the protection of. the husband is not so complete. In
the first place, there is the question as to the validity of the agreement because it is between husband and wife; 74 but normally
such agreements are upheld at least in so far as they provide for
the support of the wife.7 5 In England, the agreement is held
binding in all respects, so that a husband who pays the amount
specified therein is subject to no further liability, even though the
amount which he pays is concededly quite insufficient for the
support of the wife. 76 It would seem that an opposite result
would be reached in this country, as the wife could put an end to
the binding effect of the agreement by requesting her husband
to take her back.
But even though the wife is willing to accept the status created by the agreement and does not desire to resume cohabitation
with her husband, the provisions with respect to her support are,
as against her, not.regarded as very rigidly binding. Thus, a
provision in such an agreement by which the wife wholly gives
up her right-to support is void as contrary to public policy. 77 And

in case of any suspicion of finfair advantage taken of the wife or
even of misunderstanding by her for which no one else is to blame,
the agreement may be set aside and the husband will then have the
same liability to support her as if no such agreement had ever
been entered into. 78
Another excuse which is often tendered by husbands who are
charged with delinquency in the performance of this duty, is
their own inability. Most of the adjudications with respect to
this matter are in criminal proceedings; -but the excuse, if properly verified, is obviously a good one in any sort of case. Our
experiences of recent years have reminded us very emphatically
that the man who fails to support his family is very often in no
way to blame. In general, then, the husband must do the best
"' Jordan Marsh v. Cohen, supra note 41, holding the separation agreement invalid because between husband and wife.
MADDEN, DoEsTic RRLATIONS, (1931)
331; Shaw v. Shaw, 122 S. C.

386, 115 S. E. 322 (1923).
Eastland v. Burchell, L. R. 3 Q. B. D. 432 (1878).
Lyons v. Schanbacher, 316 Ill. 569, 147 N. E. 440 (1925).
Hamlin v. Hamlin, 129 Misc. 251, 221 N. Y. S. 247 (1927);

v. Boehm, 88 N. J. Eq. 74, 101 Atl. 423 (1917).
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he can under the circumstances, but that is all that he can be held
79

for.

It would seem, however, that he should not be excused merely
because he has no property. His earning power should likewise
be considered, 0 and it seems that the court may properly require
him to work, if. work is available; but there is some dispute on
this last point."' Of course, his inability to work will not excuse
him if he has property and credit.82 It is suggested in some
cases that previous unfair conduct of the husband, such as giving
away his property to his children, should result in holding him
liable for failure to support his wifethough he is now unable to
do so; 8 'but this seems unduly harsh, especially where a criminal
prosecution is involved. In this matter also, the validity of the
husband's excuse for non-support, because of his claimed inability
so to do, is usually a question of fact for the jury. .4
More frequently still, the husband advances as justification for
his failure to support his wife, her own misconduct. There is no
doubt that certain misconduct of the wife does forfeit any claim
for support, so that this matter must be considered in some detail.
The most obvious action which will forfeit the wife's right to
support is adultery. Even this is no excuse to the husband if
committed with his consent; 85 and it is immaterial that he gave
such consent on condition that he should no longer be liable to
support her, as such an agreement is illegal. 8-8 But normally the
adultery of the wife excuses the husband from further supporting her.8 7 It seems that the excuse applies whether the spouses
are cohabiting or separated at the time of the offense; 8-. and it
has even been held, though perhaps with undue harshness, that
though the husband unjustifiably drove the wife away, yet her
State v. McPherson, supra note 2; State v. Kelly, supra n~ote 2.
Kemp "v.Kemp, 144 La. 671, 81 So. 221 (1918-9).
Wohlfort v. Wohlfort, 116 Kans. 154, 225 Pac. 746 (1924); State v.

Witham, 70 Wis. 473, 35 N W. 934 (1888).
,' State v. Hill, supra note 2.
Kemp v. Kemp, supra note 80.
State v. Newman, 91 Conp. 6, 98 Atl. 346 (1916).
w Wilson v. Glossop, 19 Q. B. D. 379 (1887).
Ferren v. Moore, 59 N. H. 106 (1879).
Cooper v. Lloyd, 6 C, B. N. S. 518 (1859), substantially overruling
Norton v. Fazan, 1 Bos. & P. 873 (1798) ; State v. Lancaster, supra note 2.
" Houliston v. Smyth, supra note 6; Cooper v. Lloyd, supra note 87.
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subsequent adultery excused him from supporting her, since she
could at any time have compelled him to support her.8 9 At any
rate, it may be generally stated that the wife's adultery forfeits
her claim for support unless her husband's blame for the misconduct can be very clearly established.
A less serious form of misconduct, but one which just as
clearly forfeits the wife's right to support, is desertion of the
husband. There is no question that a wife who is without justification living apart from her husband is not entitled to support.90
Here, too, the husband is not subjected to liability to one who
furnishes necessaries to the wife by the fact that this outside party
did not know about the separation or that the wife was at fault.9 '
But if the wife offers in good faith to return to the husband; her
92
right to be supported at once revests.
The question remains as to what circumstances will justify
-the wife in leaving the husband, so that she will not forfeit her
right to suppor by so doing. It seems clear that harsh and
abusive treatment, even though possibly falling short of technical
cruelty will have this effect. 93 Nor will the wife's condonation of
the husband's misconduct relieve him from liability to merchants
who have furnished necessaries to the wife before she resumed
cohabitation with him. 4
If the wife is turned out of the house by the husband, though
without cruelty, or even if she departs voluntarily, but he is obviously complaisant, 95 the same result follows-he is still liable
to support her. And it appears that she will be justified in leaving if she is compelled to live with relatives of the husband who
are unkind to her, even though this is only mental cruelty and
is not participated in by the husband except by such insistence.9
Ellett v. Ellett, 157 N. C. 161, 72 S. E. 861 (1911).
"'Steinfield v. Girrard, 103 Me. 151, 68 AtI. 630 (1907); Vusler v. Cox, 53
N. J. L. 519, 22 AtI. 347 (1891); Benjamin v. Dockham, 132 Mass: 181
'

(1882).

*"Vusler v. Cox, supra note 90.
" M'Cutchen v. M'Gahay, 11 Johns. 281 (N. Y. 1814). Cf. Manby v.
Scott, 1 Mod. 781 (1659).
Mayhew v. Thayer, 8 Gray (Mass.) 172 (1857).
Reynolds v. Sweetser, 15 Gray (Mass.) 78 (1860).
Barefoot v. Barefoot, 83 N. J. Eq. 685, 93 At!. 192 (1914); Biddle v.
Frazier, 3 Houst. 258 (Del. 1864).
Spafford v. Spafford, 199 Ala. 300, 74 So. 354 (1917); Brewer v.
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In fact, it seems that in this matter of justification for leaving
home, the presumption is in favor of the wife. If the fault seems
to be. somewhat evenly divided 97-at least, if the preponderance
of fault is not clearly with the wife-she is still entitled to support. There is, of course, no requirement that the misconduct of
the husband tbe sufficient t6'give grounds for divorce, whether in
the state of matrimonial domicile or any other.98
Adultery' and desertion, which have been considered, are the
chief categories of misconduct which forfeit the claim of a wife
to support from her husband. It has been suggested that neglect of household duties by the wife should have the same effect. 99
Whatever may be the abstract justice of this theory, it is obvious
that it is unworkable (who shall decide whether the house is
properly kept?), and it seems clear that so long as the wife does
not leave home, her slackness in housekeeping, no matter how
bad, does not absolve her husband from supporting her. 00
When the wife buys necessaries under such circumstances that
her husband is bound to pay for them under the terms of the duty
to support her, he frequently makes still another excuse in endeavoring to avoid payment. This is that the credit has been extended to the wife, and accordingly he is not himself liable. It
seems clear that if the merchant deliberately decides to hold the
wife, he cannot also hold the husband. 101 This seems to be a
somewhat anomalous rule, and rests frequently, if not always,
Brewer, 79 Neb. 726, 113 N. W. 161 (1907). See Broun v. Durepo, supra
note 7.
Rearden v. Rearden, 210 Ala. 129, 97 So. 138 (1923).
"

State.v. Newman, supra note 84; Shipley v. Shipley, 187 Iowa 1295, 175

N. W. 51 (1919). In Pearson v. Pearson, 230 N. Y. 141, 129 N. E. 349
(1920) it was held that the wife was justified in leaving the husband on account of his harsh treatment of her, although cruelty is not a ground for
divorce in New York.
" Lee v. Savannah Guano Co., 99 Ga. 572, 27 S.E. 159 (1896) where the
court said: "The husband is not bound to support his wife in luxurious idleness. If she refuses to perform her obligations, she forfeits all right to demand of. him a support."
- State v. Kelly, supra note 2. The husband does not by setting up his
inability to support the wife estop himself from showing that she is, through
her own misconduct, not entitled to support. Audrain Cour~ty v. Muir, 297
Mo. 499, 249 S. W. 383 (1923).
"' Moore v. Flanagan, (1920) 1 K. B..919; Morel Bros. v. Earl of Westmoreland, (1904) A. C. 11; Jones v. Gutman, supra note 6.
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upon the same judicial confusion between true agency and support, which has already been frequently noticed.1 02- It must be
confessed that there is a certain justification for this doctrine under modern statutes removing the disabilities of married women;
but the doctrine has been applied where such statutes are not in
force.' 0 3 If the merchant charges the wife in preference to the
husband, it seems not unfair to release the latter; 104 but in fact
the scope of this doctrine is very much broader.
The better view is that the entries on the merchant's books are
not conclusive on this matter; 105 that even though he has charged
the wife on his books, he may nevertheless show that he intended
to hold the husband also.1° 6 It should not be forgotten that while
the wife may be liable, yet her liability should be secondary to the
primary one of her husband to support her, and he should not
readily be excused.10 7
In general, however, proof that credit
was extended to the wife results in the exemption from liability
of the husband; the only practical limitations of this rule being
that there is usually a presumption against credit being given to
the wife, and that mere entries on the books of the merchant are,
by the weight of, authority, not conclusive in this matter.10 8
We must still consider whether if the wife is charged, she
must herself pay. Obviously not, at common law. 10 9 And it
has been held that she is not liable where the merchant charged
her without knowing that she was married; 110 the theory of the
court being that she is not liable because she acted as an authorized agent, and this nowithstanding the fact that she did not disclose her principal. Even regarding this as a pure question of
102 Wickstrom v. Peck, 179 App. Div. 855, 167 N. Y. Supp. 408 (1917).
See comment on this case in 18 Colum. L. Rev. 368.
1" Gafford v. Dunham, 111 Ala. 551, 20 So. 346 (1896).
10. Carter
v. Howard, 39 Vt. 106 (1866). See Dolan v. Brooks, supra

note 61r
10 Beaudette v. 'Martin, 113 Me. 310, 93 Ati. 758 (1915).
10 Noel v. O'Neill, 128 Md. 202, 97 Atl. 513 (1916).
10 Edminstor; v. Smith, 13 Ida. 645, 92 Pac. 842 (1907); Clark v. Tenneson, supra note 40.
See 27 A. L. R. 544.
109

Smout v. Ibery, supra note 13.

"'

Metler v. Snow, 90 Conn. 690, 98 Atl. 322 (1916) ; Paquin v. Beauclerk,

(1906) A. C. 148. The latter case is purely one of agency, since the husband
had furnished the wife sufficient funds for her personal and family expenses.
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agency, such decisions seem unsound, as the agent of an undisclosed principal is generally personally liable.'
But it does
seem entirely proper to hold, as is generally done,1 2 that the presumption is against the married woman being personally liable.
She cannot .be held unless it is fairly clear that she intended to
bind herself," z3 but even the husband's consent to the purchase
will not necessarily absolve her from liability, if in fact she voluntarily undertook a personal obligation. 1 1 4 Even though the
article purchased is a necessary, the wife may bind herself to pay
for it; "15 though it takes a strong case for this, because of the
contrary presumption just stated.
One other defense is sometimes set up by a husband who feels
that it is unfair that he should be required to support his wife.
Where the wife has in fact been supported by her own near relative (often her father), the erring husband may claim that he is
not -bound to reimburse such relative. The theory is that the relative intends to make a gift to the wife rather than to furnish her
support at the ultimate expense of her husband; and there is a
presumption (but a rather weak one) this way.1 16 The presumption is, however, very readily rebutted, and it has been held
that this is sufficiently accomplished by the opposite and stronger
presumption that the husband is liable to support his wife." - It
has also been held (though this decision seems rather doubtful
in principle) that a husband is liable to the father of his wife for
necessaries furnished by the father to her, although the husband
had furnished the wife with abundant money-which money she
had spent for other purposes."18 It seems clear that on the whole
the husband gets little comfort from this attempted defense.
M cH M, AGSNcY (2rnd ed., 1914) § 1410.

Grandy v. Hadcock, supra note 1; Noel v. O'Neill, supra note 106.
G=
= Feiner v. Boynton, 73 N. J. L. 136, 62 Atl. 420 (1905); Brown v. Durepo, supra note 7.
" Weisker v. Lowenthal, 31 Md. 413 (1869). Cf. Stammers v. Macomb,
2 Wend. (N. Y.) 454 (1829).
' Lea Gas Co. v. Malvern, (1917) 1 K. B. 803. But cf. Paquin v. Beauclerk, supra note 110.
"' Mihalcoe v. Holub, 130 Va. 425, 107 S. E. 704 (1921) ; Biddle v. Frazier,
supra note 95.
UT Fisher v. Drew, supra note 21.
' Hall v. Fletcher, supra note 64. See p. 834 supra, for discussion of
this case.
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The main advantage which the wife obtains from this duty of
the husband to support her is, of course, protection from destitution. But occasionally, less obvious but no less real advantages
appear. A wife who has joined with her husband in a parol
agreement to convey land to a third person in consideration of his
supporting them, may refuse to convey without any quasi-contractual liability for support already furnished; for she has received, nothing to which she was not already entitled.1 19 The
husband who spends his money to purchase a home taken in the
name of his wife gets no resulting trust in his own favor, for he
has only been performing his duty to support her.' 20 For the
same reason, a man who agreed to take care of his blind wife in
-consideration of her leaving him a bequest, cannot collect from
her estate when she dies without complying with her promise.' 2 '
As has been seen, and as might be expected, the husband generally gets no advantage as against his wife through his supporting her; he is only doing what he is bound to do anyway. However, surprising as it may seem, the husband sometimes does
profit by reason of the existence of this ordinarily burdensome
duty. Thus it has been held that where the spouses had separated
amicably, and the wife was in fact supporting herself, the husband, being still ,bound to support her, was the "head of a
family," and entitled to a homestead exemption as such.' 22 And
where the spouses had entered into a -separation agreement, under the terms of which each gave up all claim to the property of
the other and the wife gave up all claim to be supported by the
husband, it was held that the latter agreemefit was illegal and
vitiated the remainder of the separation agreement; and accordingly, the husband could claim his share of the wife's estate, in
disregard of his agreement not to do so. ' The soundness of
this decision may be questioned, since it seems to involve the husband's getting an advantage against the wife through his own
failure to perform his legal duty to support her. But it is clear
Lavoie v. Dube, 229 Mass. 87, 118 N. E. 179 (1918).
0 Fry v. National Say. & T. Co., 289 Fed. 589 (D. C., 1923).
2
In re Ryan's Estate, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N. W. 820 (1908).
Appeal of Brookland Bank, 112 S. C. 400, 100 S. E. 156 (1919).
12 Lyons v. Schanbacher, supra note 77. See also Van Koten v. Van Koten,
323 Ill. 323, 154 N. E. 146 (1926).
'
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that the existence of this duty occasionally properly results in an
advantage to the husband.
METHODS or ENFORCING THE DUTY OF SUPPORT

Only one major problem, but that one of immense importance,
remains for consideration. That is the problem how this duty
of the husband is to be enforced. Like all other legal rights, its
actual value depends very largely upon the effectiveness of the
means which are afforded by the courts for enforcing it.
The conception of the common law judges was that the duty
was to be enforced through the merchants or other outside parties who have furnished the wife with necessaries. That is, the
wife is to purchase the articles required, and the tradesman is
then to collect for them from the husband. Under this conception, the wife has no direct rights against her husband; she can
act only through some person who is willing to furnish her with
necessaries and take the chance of collecting against her husband.
A few jurisdictions still insist on this view.' 24 The wife can,
of couise, proceed against her husband for divorce or judicial
separation, and as an incident thereto obtain a decree for alimony.
This amounts to a direct proceeding between the spouses for the
support of the wife; but such jurisdictions insist that alimony
decrees are proper only in suits for divorce or separation, 2 5 and
this although the wife is unwilling, for conscientious scruples or
otherwise, to bring such a proceeding. 1'
It must be remembered
also, that a wife may be entitled to support from a husband
against whom she has no legal grounds for divorce. 127 Unless
the rule in these jurisdictions is changed by statute, a wife in any
one of them has in many instances no direct right against her
husband for support.
The question remains whether this method of enforcing the
liability through tradesmen is reasonably effective. This obviThe leading authority on this point is Ball v. Montgomery, 2 Ves. Jr.
191, 195 (1793).
See also Rariden v. Rariden, 33 Ind. App. 284, 70 N. E.
398 (1904); Shannon v. Shannon, 2 Gray (Mass.) 285 (1854); Trotter v.

Trotter, supra note 31.
Ross v. Ross, 69 Ill. 569 (1873).
Adams v. Adams, 100 Mass. 365 (1868).
' See p. 839 supra.
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ously depends upon the willingness of the tradesmen to supply
goods and services under such conditions. And it is fairly obvious that the circumstances are not particularly encouraging from
their point of view.
In the first place, the tradesman is buying a law-suit, for the
husband is almost certain to refuse to pay until compelled to.
Worse yet, the chances in the suit are all in favor of, the recalcitrant husband and against the complaisant merchant. The latter takes all the risk, and has the burden of showing not only that
the husband was apparently liable, but (if it is really a case of
support and not of agency) that he is actually liable. 128 He
must show whether or not the wife is living apart from the husband, and if she is, that she is in fact justified.129 And he must
show that the wife has not been otherwise supplied with the kind
of necessaries which she has obtained from him. 180
With this heavy burden which is cast upon the tradesman to
litigate, and to prove in this litigation numerous facts as to which
he cannot possibly have any actual knowledge at the. time the
wife applies to him, it can hardly be surprising that the tradesman more usually than not declines to supply the wife who applies under such circumstances. It has been suggested that the
weli-known eagerness of merchants to sell may be depended on
to induce them to take a chance, and so supply the wife.18 1 This
may be true when the spouses are .cohabiting, and the merchant
has therefore a good chance of holding the husband under agency
principles. At all events, he knows that there is heavy social, if
not legal, pressure, which is likely to induce the husband to. pay.
But when the spouses are not cohabiting, the merchant feels quite
otherwise, especially as he realizes that even when he has obtained a judgment against the husband, it will probably not be
collectible. Under these circumstances, the wife is quite insufficiently protected unless -she has some direct right against ier
delinquent spouse.
Freestone v. Butcher, supra note 14; Rea v. Durkee, supra note 23;
Clothier v. Sigle, 73 N. J. L. 419, 63 Atl. 865 (1906).
Rea v. Durkee, supra rote 23.
See p. 834 supra. He also takes a certain risk that he may be found to
have waived his rights against the husband by having charged the wife.
See pp. 839, 840 supra.
' Wanamnaker v. Weaver, supra note 62.
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A much more satisfactory method of enforcing this duty is
through the criminal statutes. These are now practically universal, and, as already shown, 132 they are generally so drawn as
to put effective pressure on the husband to perform his duty of
support. Such statutes therefore furnish an effective recourse
to the wife of a lazy or shiftless husband. They are, however,
less reliable in persuading a recalcitrant husband to perform his
duty of support. For this purpose, a direct civil action is better.
A method of procedure which is somewhat more efficacious
than the indirect action through the merchants and yet is not
subject to the theoretical objections which some courts find to a
direct action by the wife against the husband to compel him to
support her, is an action to recover for past support on the basis
of subrogation. Here the money is furnished by some relative
or friend of the wife, -and thus by one who, because of his personal interest in her welfare, is more likely than a merchant to
be willing to advance the money and take the risk of recovery
against the husband. This is obviously a considerably better
method of enforcing the duty of support, providing the kindlydisposed relative or friend is permitted by the courts to reimburse himself, at the husband's expense. As already stated, the
basis on which such a suit for reimbursement is sustained is on
the analogy of subrogation. One or two courts refuse to permit
such a suit because there is no debt owed to the merchant, to
which the person furnishing the money to the wife can be subrogated; 133 but the weight of authority disregards this technicality and permits such an action. 134
A still further development of this principle is the suggestion
that the wife should be able to sue the husband for reimbursement of what she has necessarily spent upon her own support.
It seems entirely clear that a wife cannot sue her husband to recover damages because of his failure to support her. 13 5 The reaSee pp. 823, 824, supra.
" Skinner v. Tirrell, 159 Mass. 474, 34 N. E. 692 (1893). See for a defense of this case 1 WhLioxN, SAL S, 82. But cf. Hanover v. Turner, 14
Mass. 227 (1817).
Kenyon v. Farris, 47 Conn. 510 (1880) ; Leuppie v. Osborn, supra
note 31.
Decker v. Kedly, 148 Fed. 681 (C. C. A. 9th Circ., 1906) ; Gowin v.

Gowin, 264 S. W. 529 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924).
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sons given for this rule in the cases laying it down are not very
illuminating. But the obvious reason is that no damages can
ever be proved to have been incurred, and if any could be proved,
they could not be measured in money. But no such objection
confronts an action by the wife for reimbursement of amounts
expended in her own support; and such actions have several
times been allowed.136 In one American case, a wife who was in actual destitution
was held to have the power to sell a stove belonging to her husband (who was then in prison) in order to raise sufficient money
to buy food and other elementary necessities. 13 7 This would seem
to be a further application of the subrogation or reimbursement
theory just discussed; but the case seems to stand alone. Such
direct action does not seem to be encouraged by the courts even
in this very good cause.
Last but not least comes the most radical form of proceeding
for enforcing the performance of this duty by the husband-the
direct action by the wife to have support decreed to her. . The
effect is of an action for alimony, but without seeking a divorce
or judicial separation. This is a much more radical remedy than
a mere suit for reimbursement such as has already been discussed,
for here the decree is for future support for an indefinite period,
rather than merely to compel repayment for past expenditures.
It will readily be seen that such a suit would not even have
been thought of in the Blackstonian days of the common law.
And even now, it is not wholly clear that it should be encouraged.
The wife who is unwilling to bring an action for divorce or judicial separation might well be considered to be adequately protected-or at least adequately enough-by a combination of the
criminal statutes and actions for reimbursement. But despite
these possible theoretical objections, the enormous weight of
American authority permits such actions 13 --- though this result
has often been reached with the aid of statutes. 139 The theory
Sodowsky v. Sodowsky, 51 Okla. 689, 152 Pac. 390 (1915); De Brauwere
v. De Brauwere, 203 N. Y. 460, 96 N. E. 722 (1911). The latter case cites
Decker v. Kedly, supra note 135, as in opposition to this view; but there is no
real conflict.
Ahern v. Easterby, 42 Conn. 546 (1875).
Ann. Cai. 1913 D, p. 1132.

1 R. C. L. 878 ff.
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of the courts has been that this is the only thoroughly adequate
method of enforcing the duty of support and that it would be
neither fair nor in accordance with wise public policy to drive
the wife to a divorce action in order to enable her to take advantage of it.
The California case of Galland v. Galland 140 is generally considered as the leading American authority on this point. However, it was long preceded by a decision in South Carolina which,
in a vigorous and well-reasoned opinion, allowed such an action. 14 1 The modern cases on the point are almost innumerable. 142 It is held that this action is sufficiently analagous to
divorce proceedings so that temporary as well as permanent ali1 43
mony can be given without explicit statutory authorization.
But since it is really not a divorce suit, cruelty or other misconduct of the husband need not be pleaded or proved except to the
extent necessary to justify the wife in living apart from the husband.

44

This action for support sometimes involves interesting questions of jurisdiction and venue. It is a purely personal action
and is in no sense an action in rem, as is a divorce action. The
requirements as to domicile of the parties which may be made by
statute are therefore not jurisdictional, as in the case of divorce
actions, but relate only to venue, and so may be waived. 1 45 But
the action is not even subject to the venue restrictions of divorce
suits.1 4 6

It is transitory, and so may be maintained by a non-

resident, although a non-resident is not permitted to bring a
1 47
divorce suit.
14 38 Calif. 265 (1869).
141 Prather v. Prather, 4 Desaus. 33 (S.C. 1809).
Garland, 50 Miss. 694 (1874).

See also Garland v.

',Typical examples are Sellers v. Sellers, 208 Ala. 44, 93 So. 824 (1922);
Simonton v. Simonton, 33 Ida. 255, 193 Pac. 386 (1920); Clifton v. Clifton,
:83W. Va. 149, 83 S. E. 72 (1919); Wohlfort v. Wohlfort, supra note 81;
-agert v. Hagert, 22 N. D. 290, 133 N. W. 1035 (1911).
',Robertson v. Robertson, 138 Minn. 290, 164 N. W. 980 (1917); State
ex rel. Young v. Superior Court, 85 Wash. 72, 147 Pac. 436 (1915). But see
London v. London, 211 Ky. 271, 277 S. W. 287 (1925).
" Tutwiler v. Tutwiler, 205 Ala. 283, 87 So. 852 (1921).
140 George v. George, 190 Ky. 706, 228 S.W. 408 (1921) ; Hilton v. Second
District Court, 43 Nev. 126; 183 Pac. 317 (1919).
1. Lang v. Lang, 70 W. Va. 205, 73 S. E. 716 (1912).
The court said that
" Hiner v. Hiner, 153 Cal. 254, 94 Pac. 1044 (1908).
while divorce suits are to be restricted, suits for support are to be encouraged.
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If the husband, rather than the wife, is a non-resident but has
property in the state, the suit may be brought by attaching the
property, according to the familiar category of suits quasi in
rem. 14 s It has even been held that a state court may decree support
to a resident wife against non-resident defendant-husband who
had no property in the state, on the ground that a divorce suit
could be brought in such circumstances, and a suit for support
is analagous to one for divorce.149 The court conceded that it
was doubtful whether other states would or could be compelled
to give effect to this decree, and so that it could probably not be
enforced unless the defendant could be caught in the state where
it was rendered. This is, of course, a practical admission of the
unsoundness of the case; for if the decree were valid it would
have to be given effect to in other states under the "full faith and
credit" clause of the Federal Constitution.'"0 The decision is
unsound because of its failure to recognize that this action for
support, whatever- may be its analogies to divorce actions, is still
nothing more than a personal action, and cannot be sustained on
any other basis."5 '
CONCLUSION

It will appear from the foregoing that the authorities on this
subject are in considerable confusion. The actual difficulties are
believed, however, to -be rather more apparent than real, and the
great majority of the cases seem to reach a desirable result. Such
difficulties as still occasionally appear in the substantive law of
this subject are generally due to the failure bf the courts to distinguish between agency in its proper sense, and support.. When
it is recognized that the obligation of support is imposed upon
the husband by law and without regard to his consent, a satisfactory solution of any particular problem is at least easier and
more likely to be obtained than by confusing the subject by a
discussion of the inapplicable principles of agency. Particularly
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Bliss v. Bliss, 50 Fed. (2d) 1002 (D. C., 1931).

141 Mass. 432, 5 N. E. 830 (1886).
The husband had prop-

erty in the District of Columbia, but as the District had no statutory provisions for bringing a personal suit by attachment, the wife was without remedy.

DUTY OF HUSBAND TO SUPPORT WIFE

in the confused question of what will excuse the husband fxom
supporting the wife, it is important to remember that this is a
duty imposed by law and therefore the husband should not be permitted to absolve himself of the duty by any voluntary action of
his own. In fact it would seem better to hold that only the action
or consent of the wife should excuse the husband. On the other
hand, it would seem that a recognition of the involuntary character
of this liability might check the tendency of some courts to extend the scope of the necessaries, for which -the husband must
pay, to an unreasonable extent. Thus, a clear and conscious
recognition of the true nature of this liability will make it more
beneficial to the wife and at the same time prevent the burden to
the husband becoming unreasonable and unfair.
As to the enforcement of the duty, this seems no longer a real
problem. No doubt the common law method of indirect action
through merchants was ridiculously ineffective. But the state
has interfered not only through criminal statutes, but also, when
necessary, by statutes permitting direct actions for support. The
latter form of action, however, as well as the less radical but quite
effective action for reimbursement, have in most jurisdictions
been worked out by the courts without legislative aid. With all
these various forms of proceeding available to her, the wife who
is not able to compel her husband to support her seems to be in a
situation where the law cannot reasonably be expected to help
her. After many difficulties and not a few false starts, this problem of compelling the husband to furnish reasonable support to
the wife seems to be well on the road to a satisfactory solution.
Robert C. Brown.
UNIV R5TY Ol

INDIANA.

